Showing posts with label value investing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label value investing. Show all posts

Thursday, September 19, 2013

Zuoan Fashion Ltd (ZA): A No-Brainer For Big Returns

Just took a long position in Zuoan Fashion, Ltd. (NYSE: ZA), opportunities like this come few and far between. Not far from its IPO back 2011, Zuoan Fashion is a design-driven fashion menswear company in China that has taken a beating for no apparent reason.

The No-Brainer Aspect

The reason to me this is a no-brainer investment is because while the company is currently priced at $2.17/share, a quick look at their balance sheet in 2012 shows they have $5.96/share in net cash alone (cash minus debt). Furthermore, if we take all the current assets and pay off all outstanding debt, we're left with $11.79/share. What this means is that if the company liquidated everything tomorrow, that's how much shareholders would receive per share, which makes this a textbook Buffet/Graham/Klarman value play with a 82% margin of safety. Wow...

And the story gets better. The company has no long-term debt and no short interest whatsoever. Below is my analysis of the fundamentals versus the stock price over a 5-year period:

Zuoan Fashion Quality of Earnings Vs. Stock Price (2008-2013)
(click to enlarge)

So what we have is a company who's fundamentals are clearly growing stronger over time while the stock price is diverging to reflect the opposite. No financial shenanigans here either, their financial reports were signed off by Crowe Horwathe, one of the top 10 auditing firms in the United States. Zuoan is essentially like a straight-A student in a bad high school, the top institutions are overlooking her just because she's small and didn't go to Harvard Academy. Their loss...

Not only has their fundamentals improved, but their ability to self fund with cash is getting stronger too (defensive), which means they can weather any storm that may lie ahead because their industry is so competitive.

Industry Recognition

So what about the company? Well, the fashion industry is highly fragmented. While the company has no defensible competitive advantage against competition and its success is dependent upon its ability to recognize and create appealing fashion styles in the years to come, the company has received the #1 spot of fashion designers in China by Apparel Magazine two years in a row now, beating out major competitors such as True Religion, Ralph Lauren, Nike, Urban Outfitters, & lululemon, two times over. From the July 2013 issue of Apparel:

(click to enlarge)

And as apparel magazine mentions, they sponsor and are regularly featured on the Chinese equivalent of Project Runway, "Hello Gorgeous." What better marketing avenue could a fashion company ask for? As China's middle class grows, Zuoan's affordable fashion line stands to benefit which makes this not only a value opportunity, but a growth one as well.

Valuation

Baseline valuation is $9.08/share (assuming a 50% write-off of Accounts Receivable in a liquidation event), but if the trend continues I may hold on until $12-14, making this one a potential 6 or 7-bagger. Estimated time to value realization, 2 years, maybe even sooner.





Tuesday, September 17, 2013

A Great Value Play: Lihua International, Inc. (LIWA)

Just took a position in Lihua International (NASDAQ: LIWA) and I usually like to do some sort of writeup so I can remember in the future why I took particular positions. Lihua International is a Chinese reverse-merger company that is in the copper wiring/electrical arena. They're currently trading at about $5.07 per share ($158M market capitalization).

Asset Valuation


First thing that jumped out to me about this company is that while the market is valuing them at $158M, they have $144M in cash equivalents alone in the bank. Ignoring the $854M in revenue in 2012, this at first glance seemed to be a complete misvaluation by the market because if you divided up the cash alone, each share outstanding would receive about $4.80. In fact if you look back to 2011, if all assets were liquidated and debt paid off, net current assets per share alone are worth $11.69, and that was over two years ago:

Lihua's Net Current Asset Value/Share (2011)
(click to enlarge)

Attractive Margins

Another thing worth noting is Lihua's supply chain management. Unlike its competitors, Lihua isn't making its wiring from virgin copper, but instead scrap copper. The benefit of this is that its margins are not compressed like it's competition's because its costs are not as high, so its management of scrap copper suppliers has given it a competitive advantage:

Chinese Copper Suppliers
(click to enlarge)

Product Mix

Besides it's supply chain management, Lihua also has the benefit of focusing on one of its core product innovations, copper-clad aluminum wiring (CCA). Their high-quality pure copper wiring alternative is priced much cheaper than pure copper wiring (almost 1/3) which provides significant cost advantages in larger projects from the lower commodity price of aluminum.


Copper-Clad Aluminum (CCA) Wiring Structure


Why is this important? Because the PRC government just approved $240B to be invested in the development of China's Smart Grid infrastructure over the next five years so all of its citizens are able to receive affordable power. Along with this comes miles and miles of necessary wiring and cable running, and what better use of CCA wiring/cables than for large projects over thousands of miles. Why is Lihua set up best to benefit from this? Because they currently are the only company that has the proper license in place to import scrap copper to China from places like the United States, which makes them the only company currently able to even approach filling such large orders. Besides CCA wiring, its product mix does still include pure copper wiring, in addition to copper anodes, rods, and magnetic wiring.

In addition to China's investment in its infrastructure, China is the number one consumer and importer of copper:

Copper Demand By Region
(click to enlarge)

The trend is in no way slowing down either, current predictions are that given the trend, China's consumption and utilization of copper could soon exceed world supply, which means scrap copper suppliers are going to become vital, and Lihua is already in position to benefit from this. As far as copper commodity fluctuations go, even though copper pricing is expected to remain stable with the growing demand, Lihua's products are all priced on a cost-plus basis, which means any movement of commodity prices would not erode its profit margins.

Risk

So why does this price of $5.07/share seem too good to be true? Well, its China, which means shady business practices, and its a Chinese reverse-merger, which means potentially even shadier accounting practices. However, due to the fate of its fellow reverse-merger companies such as China MediaExpress Holdings (CCME), all Chinese reverse-mergers are being painted with the same brush by institutional investors.

In 2011, Absaroka Capital, who had taken a short position on Lihua, released a study it commissioned on Lihua trashing the company's practices and accounting methods. Among things claimed in the study included doubt regarding Lihua's financial statements, its executives' backgrounds, supplier relations, and its auditor's track record. In response to this allegations, Lihua's CFO directly addressed all claims (seen here) made by Absaroka, which in my opinion rendered them moot. In addition to that, Lihua has made strides over the past year to be as transparent as possible to the market regarding its accounting methods, even going so far as to having forensic accounting firms such as John Lees Associates do a full investigative confirmation of its cash balances. Besides this, its auditor is Crowe Horwath. While technically using Crowe Horwath's Hong Kong division, Crowe Horwath has a reputation here as one of the top ten auditing firms in the US.

Also, since these allegations were made two years ago in 2011, I'd presume Absaroka has already left its short position by now after the stock tumbled 22% from its study. In other words, they made their money, and now with Lihua's transparency of accounting practices, there's little more to gain for Absaroka or any other institution with a short interest.

Conclusion

Taking a long position in LIWA, committed half my capital allocated to this position for now in case of a dip in the price, this will allow me to average down a bit for a bigger return later. My estimated fair value of the stock is about $15, with a hedge of at least $11.69 from a net asset valuation. Expected time for value manifestation is about 2-3 years, with a option for future review of fundamentals at the $12/share mark.







Wednesday, July 6, 2011

All Humans Are Value Seekers

Kind of broad statement, but it’s simple and it’s true so think about that for a second: All humans are value seekers. For the last few years I’ve kind of been obsessed with the concept of value. Value can mean all sorts of things and doesn’t necessarily have to pertain to money. That being said value as it pertains to money can provide us good direction in defining exactly what value is. Whether we are buying a house for less than what it’s worth, or a stock, or jewelry or whatever, it’s obvious that value plays a big part in our lives.

Then why is it so hard to define what the value of something is exactly? In real estate, how are houses typically valued? Comparables. That’s because value is so elusive that we have to look at things outside of something in order to determine how much it’s actually worth. Kind of crazy when you think about it right? We’re determining how valuable something is not by looking at the thing itself, but by looking at other things. It almost sounds a little insane, but that’s the nature of value, there's an essence of relativity.

Humans by nature are value seekers, meaning that they are constantly in pursuit of things they perceive to be worth in excess of the price paid for them. Why does someone pay $250,000 for a Ferrari? Because the person perceives that the value of that Ferrari ̶ the prestige, the glamour, the stares of hatred from passerbys ̶ is all worth much more than $250,000 because if it wasn’t they’d go buy something else. How many times have you saw something you liked, found out the price of it and said “Nah, that’s not worth it”? That’s this value-seeking concept at work.

As social animals, we tend to gravitate towards people that we perceive to have high value. Unconsciously, the reason why we befriend someone or start a relationship with someone is because we perceive that the value we can extract from that person is worth well in excess of the value we must give to that person in return. When do relationships end? When people feel like they are giving more than they are getting back.

But the biggest takeaway about value is that even though value is real, it’s still only a perception. It’s a perception with justifications, but just a perception nonetheless. Think about how that can work to your advantage in your life or in your career. The value of anything is defined only by our perception of it. How can we guarantee success in business or our career? It’s simple: give more than you ask for in compensation. 

The concept of giving really comes full circle here sociologically, in the fact that a person’s true value is determined exclusively by how much they give versus how much they ask for in return. That’s why 50/50 is a losing proposition in any relationship or business deal, the result is net-zero ̶ no value.

It’s a crazy concept that I’m still wrapping my head around myself, but undeniable at the same time…


Value = Perceived Worth – Price Paid


Friday, February 26, 2010

Refining The Capital Asset Pricing Model for Practical Investment Use

The capital asset pricing model is a great display of academic prowess in financial theory. However, it does have its limitations. Mainly, the criticism it receives is that it makes a number of assumptions that do not necessarily hold true in market conditions. The biggest one I feel is is the beta coefficient, or β.

To break it down the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is a way of determining the cost of equity for a company. This is often also referred to as the investor's expected rate of return for investing in a security. The formula is as follows:

E(R_i) = R_f + \beta_{i}(E(R_m) - R_f)\,
where:

E (Ri) = expected rate of return of investment i
Rf = the risk free rate of return (usually the 10-year bond return)
βi = beta coefficient of investment i (the individual price volatility of the investment relative to the market as a whole).
E(Rm) = expected return of the market as a whole


The biggest concern is with β. The capital asset pricing model as it stands alone assumes that the riskiness of an investment is based upon the past price volatility of the investment. This is HUGE assumption, because future prices cannot be accurately extrapolated from the past prices. Market prices of a security are determined not only by supply and demand from investors, but also the profitability and growth prospects of a security. The beta coefficient is assuming that market prices are efficient and that all information is known to all investors.

However, we know that not all information is known to all investors, and not all information is important to all investors. Also time horizons for investors differ (another huge assumption of the model), therefore even if all information was known, some information may disregarded by short term investors if it does not serve their time horizon. The information that a trader will be looking at may affect his view of the price, while a long term value investor may see information that reflects his view of the price.

In present circumstances, the current market prices are the averages of investor perceptions. Therefore, if most investors are arguably short term oriented, the price of that stock will more favorably reflect short term prospects. For example, if Ford stock has low upwards movement prospects in the short term because Ford is taking non-cash charges (thus reducing current earnings) , the majority of investors may be uninterested in that stock, and the price of the stock will reflect there lack of demand for it.

This is why it is important to have a somewhat longer investment horizon. You want to account for short term prospects and long term prospects. Yeah, Ford may be taking short-term non-cash charges and reducing their earnings, but is a non-cash charge really a reflection of a change in business value, especially if the company is still making adequate capital expenditures to improve the business for the long term?

The market is not perfectly efficient, which gives the individual investor an edge if they are willing to resist the temptation of short term sentiments.

So how do we adapt CAPM for reliably determining the cost of equity? Simplistically, an investor can expect the market to return 11% on average over time. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that an investor should expect no more than an 11% return on average from their portfolio (this is supported by the latest indexing fad).

Even though the expected return may fall short of what an investor's actual return may be, it is fair to say that a prudent and rational investor should expect no more than what the market will return (unless of course the risk free rate were to exceed that, in which case the last thing anybody would be concerned about is their return on investment when the whole market is collapsing!).

With the cost of equity set to be at a value of 11%, the discount rate for a security can thus be figured out by the company's weighted cost of capital, utilizing the borrowing rates of a company after taxes and our constant cost of equity. Thus we have a maximum discount rate for a public company to be no more than 11%* (if the company is 100% equity financed).

This figure to me seems fair, considering Warren Buffet discounts utilizing only the risk free rate.





*This discount rate only can be comfortably applied to non-controlling shares of publicly traded companies of a reasonable size (excluding micro caps) without getting into liquidity discounts, size discounts, and control premiums.